Observing human interaction with physical devices by Massen, Cristina
Exp Brain Res (2009) 199:49–58
DOI 10.1007/s00221-009-1971-6
123
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Observing human interaction with physical devices
Cristina Massen 
Received: 12 March 2009 / Accepted: 29 July 2009 / Published online: 18 August 2009
© The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Previous study has shown that if we observe
another person operating a tool or physical device, then the
action rule of the observed action is automatically activated
and can subsequently facilitate own actions. In this study,
the mechanisms responsible for this automatic priming of
actions are investigated. In two experiments, the question is
raised whether priming arises from the observation of the
physical device and its movements, or whether it is modu-
lated by aspects of the person’s behaviour. Whereas experi-
ment 1 shows that priming eVects are not inXuenced by the
eVector used by the observed person, experiment 2 demon-
strates that they are modulated by the handle (and associ-
ated action rule) that is used to operate the device. These
results suggest that motor resonance mechanisms are sensi-
tive to the speciWc interaction between movements of an
actor and associated movements of a physical device.
Keywords Motor resonance · Action priming · 
Action observation · Man–machine interaction · Tool use · 
Imitation
Observing human interaction with physical devices
In recent years, evidence has accumulated that observing
another person perform an action automatically activates
corresponding motor programmes in the observer. Evidence
for this phenomenon of motor resonance has been obtained
both in behavioural studies (e.g., Brass et al. 2001;
Edwards et al. 2003; Dijkerman and Smit 2007) and in
studies using neurophysiological, electrophysiological or
neuroimaging methodology (e.g. Gallese et al. 1996;
Rizzolatti et al. 2001; Fadiga et al. 1995; Iacoboni et al. 1999;
Grafton et al. 1996). In many of the studies cited, the eVects
of observing simple transitive or intransitive movements1
were studied. However, the human action repertoire is by
no means restricted to simple movements such as reaching
for an object or pointing to it. In everyday life, we quite
often interact with complex physical devices that serve as
tools to achieve our goals. For example, we ride a bike or
steer a car to reach other places faster and with less bodily
eVort. We row a boat when travelling on water. In the
household, many diVerent mechanical and electrical
devices like washing machines, sewing machines, can or
bottle openers are used to improve the eVectiveness of our
actions. In all of the examples cited, movements of the act-
ing person are transformed into movements and/or eVects
of the physical device at hand. For example, when a person
sitting in a rowboat wants the boat to go right (in the direc-
tion of motion), he or she moves his or her right arm and
the oar handle towards the body, which causes the blade of
the oar to move through the water in the opposite direction.
Alternatively, he or she can also move the left arm and left
oar handle away from the body, which causes the blade of
the oar to move through the water in a direction towards the
body. In this example, movements of the left or right arm
are transformed into movements of the blades of the oars
and Wnally into movements of the boat. C. Massen (&)
Max-Planck-Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, 
Leibniz Research Centre for Working Environment 
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1 Transitive movements involve manipulation of objects, whereas
intransitive movements express ideas or feelings.50 Exp Brain Res (2009) 199:49–58
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This study is concerned with the eVects of observing
another person interacting with a physical device. From the
perspective of simulation theory (Jeannerod 2001), the
question arises whether observing the movements of the
acting person automatically primes corresponding motor
activity in the same way as with simpler actions without
any devices involved. However, if action simulation sub-
serves the function of understanding (Gallese et al. 1996;
see also Rizzolatti et al. 1996), or predicting the outcome
(cf. Schubotz and von Cramon 2002; Wilson and Knoblich
2005; Flanagan and Johansson 2003; Prinz 2006) of others’
actions, then it might not be suYcient to just simulate the
movements of the acting person. Instead, some kind of sim-
ulation of the behaviour of the physical device seems nec-
essary to fully understand the actions and their
environmental consequences. It might even be the case that
humans neglect the movements of the acting person under
these circumstances, and instead focus on the behaviour of
the physical device instead. Three pieces of evidence from
the literature on action observation and motor resonance
might be taken as hints to suggest that participants could
focus on the behaviour of the physical device when observ-
ing humans interacting with physical devices or machines.
First, evidence from single-cell recordings shows that
activity of monkey F5 mirror neurons often relates to the
function or meaning of an action, irrespective of the exact
movement observed. For instance, Kohler et al. (2002)
found mirror neurons that discharged both when the animal
performed an action and when it only heard the action-
related sound. Ferrari et al. (2005) described a type of tool-
responding mirror neurons whose response was speciWc for
the kind of tool used to perform an action.
Second, it has been argued, that the same system that is
involved in simulating others’ actions is also used for visual
imagery and the prediction of behaviour of non-living
objects or entities (cf. Grush 2004). For instance, Schubotz
and von Cramon (2002) have demonstrated in a fMRI study
that predicting perceptual events activates corresponding
motor schemes in lateral premotor cortex. More speciW-
cally, it was shown that the prediction of the size of a
stimulus activated premotor areas involved in hand
movements, whereas the prediction of pitch in auditory
sequential events engaged premotor areas involved in artic-
ulation. Other evidence suggests that the mirror neuron
system responds to both human and robotic actions (Press
et al. 2005, 2007; Gazzola et al. 2007, but see Kilner et al.
2003). Although there are also studies from the literature
showing that cognitive processing of biological motion
may diVer from the processing of non-biological motion
(e.g., ShiVrar and Freyd 1993; Press et al. 2005; Kilner
et al. 2003), this evidence strongly suggests that motor res-
onance phenomena are by no means restricted to living
human or non-human beings. Furthermore, action priming
studies have revealed that the mere observation of station-
ary objects and tools may lead to an automatic activation of
corresponding actions (e.g., Tucker and Ellis 1998, 2004;
Grafton et al. 1997; Murata et al. 1997).
A third line of evidence, that might be relevant in our
context, stems from the Weld of observational skill learning.
Here, it has generally been shown that watching another
person perform a motor skill (e.g., practising Tai Chi exer-
cises or ballet postures) can have beneWcial eVects on one’s
own performance. In many studies on this topic, the
observed movements were associated with some kind of
external stimuli or object movements (e.g., a ski simulator,
see Whiting et al. 1987), lending the opportunity for obser-
vational learning on the basis of the observed object move-
ments (cf. Vogt 1995). In addition, Wulf et al. (2002, see
also McNevin et al. 2003) have shown that, in motor skill
acquisition in general, attention to more distal eVects of
one’s own movements is more eVective than attention to
the movements themselves. On the basis of these results, it
seems reasonable to predict motor resonance for move-
ments of objects and physical devices when man–machine
interaction is observed.
This study tries to shed light on the processing mecha-
nisms that enable people to understand (and eventually imi-
tate) observed interaction with physical devices. We used a
paradigm in which participants have to operate a mechani-
cal lever device (cf. Massen and Prinz 2007a, b). The lever
is mounted horizontally on a plastic plate and movable
around one of two possible pivotal points (see Fig. 1).
The task is to touch one of two targets with the lever by
moving its handle in the appropriate direction (towards or
away from the body), taking into account the momentarily
active pivotal point of the lever. For example, if the lever is
movable around the left pivotal point, as shown in Fig. 1,
the handle on the right side of the lever has to be moved
away from the body (i.e. arm extension is required) to touch
the far target, and towards the body (arm Xexion) to
touch the near target. When the handle is on the right, the
Fig. 1 Lever apparatus used in the experiments. From ‘movements,
actions and tool-use actions’ by C. Massen and W. Prinz, in press,
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. Copyright 2009 by
The Royal Society
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left pivotal point thus implements a compatible target-to-
movement mapping (or action rule) because bodily move-
ment direction and direction of the target reached are
always the same. If the lever is movable around the right
pivotal point, then the handle has to be moved towards the
body to touch the far target point, and away from the body
to touch the near target point. Hence, when the handle is on
the right, the right pivotal point implements an incompati-
ble action rule, because the direction of the bodily move-
ment and the direction of the target reached are always
opposite to each other.
In the experimental session, two participants are sitting
side by side, each operating their own lever device. Taking
turns in acting, they have to observe the lever action of the
other person in trial n ¡ 1 and subsequently execute a lever
action in trial n. Trial transitions from n ¡ 1 to n are manip-
ulated in four conditions. In the Wrst condition, the pivotal
point (i.e. the action rule), the target and also the bodily
movement direction (towards or away from the body) are
repeated from trial n ¡ 1 (observation) to trial n (execu-
tion). In the second condition, only the pivotal point is
repeated, whereas target and bodily movement direction
change. In the third condition, the pivotal point changes,
the target is repeated, and the movement also changes. In
the fourth condition, both the pivotal point and the target
change, but the bodily movement direction is repeated.
With this setup, it is possible to analyse the eVects of
observing the other’s action in trial n ¡ 1 on executing an
action in trial n. A previous study on this topic (Massen and
Prinz 2007b) has yielded the result that participants show
better performance (in terms of reaction times and/or error
rates) when they have observed a lever action with the same
pivotal point (i.e. the same action rule) in the previous trial,
even when target and bodily movement directions were
diVerent. These results suggest that the observation of com-
plex actions leads to an automatic activation of the action
rule observed. However, they leave open the question
whether participants simulate the behaviour of the physical
device observed (ignoring the movements of the person
observed), or whether their simulation includes aspects of
the person’s behaviour.
In order to investigate this question, in this study, exper-
imental conditions were created that diVered with respect to
the behaviour of the person observed, but were constant
with respect to the functioning of the physical device. In
experiment 1, participants observed a model person acting
either with the same or the other arm (but with the same
handle), which did not aVect observational priming. In
experiment 2, participants observed a model that executed
actions using the handle on the other side of the lever device,
but with the same arm. In this group, the action rule imple-
mented by each pivotal point reverses for the model (i.e., if
the right handle is used, the left pivotal point implements
the compatible rule and the right one the incompatible, but if
the left handle is used, the left pivotal point implements the
incompatible rule and the right one the compatible). The
results show that priming eVects are modulated by the way
the lever is operated and suggest that action priming is sensi-
tive to the speciWc interaction between human movements
and associated movements of a physical device.
Experiment 1
In experiment 1, a model and a participant were sitting side
by side, taking turns in operating their lever devices. The
participants always used their right arm and the right handle
of their lever device. One group of participants observed a
model who executed lever actions with the left arm (but
using the right handle, see Fig. 2), the other group of partic-
ipants observed a model who used the right arm and the
right handle, similar to the participants did. If participants
simulate the lever device, then the eVects of observation
(i.e. better performance in the conditions where the pivotal
point/action rule is repeated) should not be modulated by
the eVector used by the model person. However, if group
diVerences are found, then it may be concluded that partici-
pants include speciWc aspects of the model’s behaviour (i.e.
the eVector used) in their simulation.
Method
Participants
Sixty right-handed participants from the subject pool of the
Max-Planck-Institute in Leipzig served as participants, 30
in each observation condition. They were paid 7 Euros for
their participation. The local ethics committee approved the
study, and all the participants gave informed consent.
Fig. 2 Experimental setup in experiment 1. The Wgure shows the
group who observed a model using the left arm to operate the lever
device52 Exp Brain Res (2009) 199:49–58
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Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of a metallic lever that was mounted
horizontally on a plastic plate (62.5 cm £ 44.5 cm) and
movable around two possible pivotal points (see Fig. 1).
These were located in a distance of 32.5 cm to each
other and in a distance of 11 cm from the near end of the
respective lever handle. Each pivotal point could be
locked and unlocked by a magnet attached beneath it. If
one of them was unlocked, the lever was movable
around the other one; if both were locked, the lever was not
movable at all. Two possible target points (wired, elastic
pins with a light diode on top of it), which were situated
orthogonal to the lever (each at a distance of 10 cm from
the lever and of 16 cm from the pivotal points), could be
touched with the lever by moving its handle in the appropri-
ate direction (towards versus away from the body in the
horizontal plane), depending on the momentarily ‘active’
pivotal point. A reversal movement (initiation of the move-
ment in the wrong direction and subsequent correction) was
possible.
If one of the target pins was touched by the lever (partic-
ipants were instructed to stop at the target, but it was diY-
cult to go through the target position anyway because of the
wired elastic pins), then the light diode on top of it was
turned on. Light diodes on each pivotal point signalled
whether it was active at the moment (if the light diode was
turned on, then the lever was movable around this point).
The light diodes could be turned on and oV by signals via
the parallel port of a standard IBM-compatible computer,
and the pivotal points could be locked or unlocked by it. In
turn, the computer received signals about the position of the
lever: Whether it was in the resting position, left it in the
direction away from the body or left it in the direction
towards the body, and touched the far-target point or
touched the near-target point.
Design and procedure
The experiment took place in a dimly illuminated room.
Model persons2 were already familiar with the task and
were counterbalanced across groups. In order to motivate
new participants to pay attention to the expert’s actions,
they were instructed to take turns in acting with an expert
(model) person and to pay attention to this expert’s actions.
The model person was instructed to also watch the actions
of the new participant in turn. The model person, who was
sitting on the left, was always the one to begin, acting in tri-
als with odd numbers. The participant performed in trials
with even numbers. Only the data of the participant were
analysed.
Both lever devices were connected to two diVerent paral-
lel ports of the same computer. This allowed us to indepen-
dently control trial events for the two lever devices. For
each participant, there were four diVerent combinations of
pivotal (left/right) and target points (far/near). As trial
events for both participants were independent from one
another, this resulted in 16 possible types of transitions
between observation trials in n ¡ 1 and execution trials in
n. These can be reduced to four relevant transition condi-
tions (pivot and target repeated; pivot repeated/target
changed; pivot changed/target repeated, pivot changed/tar-
get changed). All the possible transitions appeared equally
often and in a randomized order. We also controlled for the
eVects of trial n ¡ 2. Participants were informed about
the task, which was to touch one of the target points with
the lever by moving the lever’s handle in the appropriate
direction. Each trial started with a preparation interval of
1600 ms. Then one of the target point diodes and one of the
pivotal point diodes were turned on to inform the subject
about the active pivotal point and the target point to touch.
Simultaneously with the appearance of the instruction
lights, the other pivotal point was unlocked to allow the
lever to rotate around the active, lighted pivotal point.
The acting subject had to decide in which direction to move
the lever handle. Reaction time was deWned as the time
from the lighting of the diodes to the lever’s leaving of
the resting position. As soon as the participant reacted and the
lever left its resting position, all the diodes were turned oV
until one of the target points was reached and touched by
the lever, which caused the light diode on the target point to
again light up. Movement time was measured from the
point in time when the lever left its resting position until
one of the target points was touched.
After one of the target points had been touched, the lever
was to be moved back to the resting position, all the lights
were turned oV and both pivotal points were locked. Then,
the next trial started.
There was a practice block of 20 trials (except for the
number of trials, the practice block was identical to the
experimental blocks of the respective condition). Partici-
pants went through one experimental block of 256 trials.
Thus, they observed 128 trials executed by the model and
executed 128 trials themselves. The experiment took
approximately 25 min.
Results
Dependent variables were reaction times for correct
responses and error rates. Errors were all reactions that were
initiated in the wrong movement direction, irrespective
2 The reason for using an expert in the experiments was that we exclud-
ed all those trials from analysis in which the model made an error and
we wanted to minimize the number of these errors.Exp Brain Res (2009) 199:49–58 53
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of whether they were corrected or not. All the trials after an
error made by the model in trial n ¡ 1 were excluded from
analysis.3 Anticipations (RT < 100 ms) were also excluded
from analysis. As there were no eVects on movement times,
they are not reported in the following. An alpha level of
0.05 was used for all the statistical tests.
Reaction times
Median reaction times for correct responses were calcu-
lated for each transition condition and each participant.
Data were analysed with a three-way ANOVA with group
(same eVector observed versus diVerent eVector observed)
as between-subjects factor and pivot transition (pivot
repeated versus pivot changed), and target transition (target
repeated versus target changed) as within-subjects factors.
Mean RTs are depicted in Table 1.
The ANOVA revealed a signiWcant main eVect of pivot
transition (F(1, 58) =8 . 6 ;  P < 0.01; MSE = 874.4), which
was due to faster reaction times when participants had
observed an action with the same pivot/rule in the previous
trial (cf. Fig. 3, left panel). Neither the main eVect of group
(F(1, 58) =2 . 8 ;  P = 0.10; MSE = 25119.2) nor any other
eVect reached statistical signiWcance (all Fs < 1). Analyses
within groups indicated that the main eVect of pivot transi-
tion was signiWcant in the group who observed a model
using the right arm (F(1, 29) =5 . 2 ;  P < 0.05; MSE = 586.4)
and just missed statistical signiWcance in the group who
observed a model using the left arm (F(1, 29) =3 . 9 ;
P = 0.057, MSE = 1162.5).
Error rates
For each participant, error rates in each of the four transi-
tion conditions were calculated. The means are depicted in
Table 1. The ANOVA revealed a signiWcant main eVect of
pivot transition (F(1, 58) = 13.9; P < 0.01; MSE = 72.5) that
was because of participants committing fewer errors when
they had observed an action with the same pivot in the pre-
vious trial (cf. Fig. 3, right panel). Analyses within groups
showed that the main eVect of pivot transition was signiW-
cant in the group who observed a model using the right arm
(F(1, 29) = 5.4; MSE = 62.1; P < 0.05) and also in the other
group (F(1, 29) = 8.5; MSE = 82.9; P < 0.01). Neither the
main eVect of group (F(1, 58) = 1.6; MSE = 677.3; P = 0.20)
nor any other eVect reached statistical signiWcance (all
Fs<1 ) .
Discussion
Experiment 1 was conducted to investigate whether the
eVects of observing a model person operating a physical
3 Performance of the model participants in the trials preceding those
that were analysed for participants did not diVer signiWcantly when
analysed as a function of group and transition condition of the subse-
quent trial. In experiment 1, there was a trend towards slower RTs and
MTs when models used the left arm, but this trend was not signiWcant.
In experiment 2, there were no eVects of group or subsequent transition
condition for model participants.
Table 1 Reaction Times (RTs, in ms) and Percentage Error (PE) in experiments 1 and 2 as a function of group and transition condition
Transition condition
Pivot repeated/
target repeated
Pivot repeated/
target changed
Pivot changed/
target repeated
Pivot changed/
target changed
Group RT PE RT PE RT PE RT PE
Exp 1: EVector Same 420 23.4 426 26.2 431 28.3 435 28.0
DiVerent 452 18.9 459 20.5 471 24.6 465 24.6
Exp 2: Handle Same 409 23.1 424 24.3 431 29.6 426 30.8
DiVerent 437 21.4 430 23.6 432 23.6 433 25.3
Fig. 3 Reaction Times (in ms) 
and Error Rates (in %) as a func-
tion of pivot transition and group 
in experiment 1. Error bars show 
standard deviations54 Exp Brain Res (2009) 199:49–58
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device are modulated by the eVector used by the model.
The results show that participants in both groups made
fewer errors and were faster when they had observed an
action with the same pivotal point and action rule in the
previous trial. However, these eVects were not inXu-
enced by the eVector used by the model. One further
aspect of the results of experiment 1 should be noted,
though. Although the main eVect of group did not reach
statistical signiWcance, participants who observed a
model using the same arm were faster than participants
who observed a model using the other arm. Note how-
ever, that they also made more errors than participants
of the other group (although again not signiWcant), sug-
gesting a speed–accuracy tradeoV here. If this pattern is
not due to a priori diVerences between the two groups, it
could indicate that the observation of a model’s behav-
iour biases the participant towards not only faster, but
also more error-prone response when the model’s behav-
iour and response requirements closely match those of
his own.
One possible explanation for the lack of a clear inXuence
of the observed eVector on priming eVects is that the partic-
ipants simply imagine the behaviour of the physical device.
In this context, it should be noted that the observation
eVects we report are not due to perceptual priming arising
from the task cues. In our previous study, the eVects were
still found under conditions where the task cues of the
model are either not visible for the observer, or not present
because the pivot remains constant within a person. Hence,
priming arising from observation must be due to the obser-
vation of the movements of the lever device according to
the explanation oVered above.
Another possibility is that changing the eVector used by
the model might be too weak a manipulation to test the
hypothesis that priming eVects are inXuenced by the move-
ments of the person observed. Although eVector-speciWc
action priming eVects have been reported in the literature
(e.g. Bach et al. 2007; Buccino et al. 2001; Gillmeister
et al. 2008), there are also studies on intentional imitation
suggesting that humans often neglect the eVector with
which an observed action is executed (e.g., Bekkering et al.
2000; Wohlschläger et al. 2003). Therefore, in experiment
2, the way how the model operated the lever device was
changed in a more substantial way to test whether the
results of experiment 1 would be replicated under these
conditions.
Experiment 2
In experiment 2, one half of the participants observed a
model operating the lever device using the left handle (cf.
Fig. 4), whereas the other half observed a model that used
the right handle to operate it. If the left handle is used, then
the action rule implemented by each pivotal point reverses:
The left pivotal point deWnes an incompatible and the right
one a compatible rule, as compared to a compatible rule
deWned by the left pivotal point and an incompatible rule
deWned by the right pivotal point if the right handle is used.
Thus, the action rules that have to be applied to touch one
of the targets reverse, when the left handle is used. Note
however, that the movements of the physical device remain
exactly the same, regardless of whether the right or left
handle is used to operate it.
If participants only simulate the physical device and its
movements, then they should always beneWt from a repeti-
tion of the pivotal point across trials, even if this means that
an action with a diVerent action rule is observed when the
model uses the left handle. Conversely, if the participants
only simulate the abstract action rule applied by the model,
then priming eVects should reverse when the model used
the left handle. In this case, performance should be better
when the pivotal point changes because then the action rule
remains the same. If participants take into account both
aspects of the action, then priming eVects should be
reduced or even disappear when the model uses the left
handle.
Method
Participants
Seventy-two right-handed participants from the subject
pool of the Max-Planck Institute in Leipzig served as par-
ticipants. None of them had participated in experiment 1.
They were paid 7 Euros for their participation. The local
ethics committee approved the study, and all the partici-
pants gave informed consent.
Fig. 4 Experimental setup in experiment 2. The Wgure shows the
group, who observed a model using the left handle to operate the lever
deviceExp Brain Res (2009) 199:49–58 55
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Apparatus
The apparatus was the same as in experiment 1.
Design and procedure
Participants used the right arm and the right handle to oper-
ate their lever device. They were randomly assigned to one
of two groups in which model persons used their right arm
to operate either the left handle (Wrst group) or the right
handle (second group). Model persons as well as sitting
positions of participants were counterbalanced across
groups. In all other respects, the procedure was the same as
in experiment 1.
There was a practice block of 20 trials. Participants went
through one experimental block of 256 trials. The experi-
ment took approximately 25 min.
Results
Reaction times
Data were analysed with a three-way ANOVA with handle
group (model uses the same handle versus model uses the
other handle) as between-subjects factor and pivot transition
(pivot repeated versus pivot changed) and target transition
(target repeated versus target changed) as within-subjects fac-
tors. Mean RTs are depicted in Table 1. The ANOVA yielded
no signiWcant main eVect of pivot transition (F(1, 70) =3 . 2 ;
MSE = 670.1;  P = 0.08), but a signiWcant interaction of
pivot transition and handle group (F(1, 70) =5 . 0 ;  M S E=
670.1, P < 0.05). This interaction (cf. Fig. 5, left panel) was
due to the fact that participants who observed actions with
the same handle had faster reaction times when the pivot of
the device was the same between trials (F(1, 35) =7 . 5 ;
MSE = 730.6;  P < 0.01), whereas there was no eVect of
pivot transition for the other group (F(1, 35) < 1; MSE = 609.6).
Furthermore, the ANOVA revealed no main eVect of tar-
get transition (F(1, 70) < 1; MSE =  697.1) nor of the
interaction between target transition and handle group
(F(1, 70) = 1.8; MSE = 697.1). The only other signiWcant
eVect was a three-way interaction of target transition, pivot
transition and handle group (F(1, 70) =5 . 5 ;   P <0 . 0 5 ;
MSE = 617.5). Analyses within groups indicated that for
participants who observed a model using the same handle,
there was a signiWcant interaction between pivot transition
and target transition (F(1, 35) =6 . 2 ;   P < 0.05; MSE = 570.2),
indicating that the main eVect of pivot transition was
mainly driven by fast RTs in the condition where both,
pivot and target, were repeated. No such eVect occurred in
participants who observed a model using the other handle
(F(1, 35) < 1; MSE = 664.8).
Error rates
Error rates are depicted in Table 1. The ANOVA yielded a
signiWcant main eVect of pivot transition, which was due
to lower error rates when participants had observed a
lever action with the same pivot in the previous trial
(F(1, 70) = 13.1; MSE = 98.8; P < 0.01). The interaction of
pivot transition and handle group just missed statistical sig-
niWcance (F(1, 70) = 3.9; MSE = 98.8; P = 0.054). Analyses
within groups indicated that the main eVect of pivot transi-
tion was signiWcant for participants who observed a model
using the same handle (F(1, 35) = 12.0; MSE = 128.3;
P < 0.01), whereas it was not signiWcant for the other group
(F(1, 35) = 2.0; MSE = 69.3). There were no signiWcant
eVects of handle group (F(1, 70) = 1.1; MSE = 811.0), target
transition (F(1, 70) = 3.0; MSE = 60.7) or any other eVect (all
Fs < 1). Figure 5 (right panel) shows error rates for both
groups, collapsed across the conditions with pivot repeated
versus pivot not repeated.
Discussion
The results of experiment 2 show that participants do not
simply simulate the physical device and its movements.
Although exactly the same lever movements were
observed in the two observation conditions of experi-
ment 2, priming through observation was only evident for
Fig. 5 Reaction Times (in ms) 
and Error Rates (in %) as a func-
tion of pivot transition and group 
in experiment 2. Error bars show 
standard deviations56 Exp Brain Res (2009) 199:49–58
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participants who observed a model operating the same
handle of the lever.
Furthermore, the results are also not consistent with the
hypothesis that participants only simulate the action rule
applied by the model, ignoring the functioning of the tool.
In this case, priming eVects should have reversed for those
participants who observed actions with the other handle.
This was not the case, however. The pattern of results
obtained suggests that priming eVects are sensitive to both
the action rules applied by the model and the behaviour of
the tool.4
A somewhat surprising feature of the results is the fact
that for RTs, the eVect of pivot repetition was modulated by
the target factor for participants who observed a model
using the same handle. This result seems to suggest that
priming is dependent on both pivot and target repetitions
and shows that target information is also taken into
account. However, as there were no eVects of target transi-
tion (or of its interaction with pivot transition) either in our
previous study or in experiment 1 of this study, caution
seems warranted in placing too much emphasis on this
aspect of the results. Further study is required to clarify
whether this is a reliable result, and if so, under what condi-
tions it emerges.
It might be objected that the observation of a model
using the other handle to operate the lever device goes
along with the observation of a somewhat awkward grip,
because models used their right arm at the left handle. In
another experiment from our lab, which has not been
included in this study due to space limitations, models used
the left arm at the left handle and the results were essen-
tially the same, with no priming emerging from observa-
tion. This renders any explanation in terms of awkwardness
of the grip observed unlikely.
General discussion
The experiments conducted in this study aimed at further
investigating priming mechanisms in the observation of
others interacting with a physical device. More speciWcally,
the question was raised whether participants would focus
on the behaviour of the physical device, or whether obser-
vational eVects would reXect the behaviour of the human
model. Whereas experiment 1 showed that priming eVects
are not modulated by the eVector that is used by the model,
experiment 2 demonstrated that they are sensitive to the
handle and action rule used by the model.
On the one hand, these results replicate previous results
(cf. Massen and Prinz 2007b) in demonstrating that partici-
pants show better performance when they have observed a
lever action with the same pivotal point and action rule in
the previous trial. On the other hand, the results obtained
extend those of our previous study in showing that partici-
pants neither exclusively focus on the behaviour of the
physical device, nor exclusively simulate the abstract action
rule applied by the model. Instead, the pattern of results
suggests that action priming eVects are rather speciWc and
reXect the combination of both aspects of the action.
There are many studies from the literature on imitation
that suggest that participants decompose an observed action
into hierarchically organized subcomponents, of which the
goal component is the most important and receives more
attention than the means with which it is achieved (e.g.,
Bekkering et al. 2000; Wohlschläger et al. 2003). However,
other studies (e.g., Bird et al. 2007) have failed to Wnd evi-
dence for such an imitation-speciWc dominance of goals in
action observation. Instead, they have shown that the
saliency of an action component in the respective action
context determines what is activated in action observation.
Consistent with these results, for the more complex actions
investigated here, the abstract way (the how) an action is
performed seems to be more important than the target of the
action.
On the one hand, the way how the action is performed is
determined by the pivotal point or functioning of the
mechanical device. Therefore, one might expect partici-
pants to focus attention on its behaviour and disregard the
behaviour of the model (e.g., whether it uses the right or
left handle as a means to make the lever move). More gen-
erally speaking, if humans operate technical devices, they
themselves can be considered a means to make the device
behave in the desired way, and their behaviour might there-
fore be neglected in action observation.
On the other hand, there is also evidence for a special
role of human and/or biological motion for action obser-
vation and action simulation. For instance, Kilner et al.
(2003) demonstrated that observing another human mak-
ing incongruent movements had a signiWcant interference
eVect on simultaneously executed movements, whereas
no interference occurred when participants observed a
robotic arm making incongruent movements. Press et al.
(2005) reported that observation of an incongruent robotic
movement can lead to interference with a simultaneously
executed action, but to a lesser degree than observation of
an incongruent human movement. These results suggest a
special preference for simulating movements of a person
as opposed to simulating those of objects or physical
devices.
4 This interpretation is further corroborated by an analysis of the data
of the model participants as a function of handle condition and transi-
tion condition in the previous trial. They showed signiWcant priming
eVects for repeating the pivot of the lever device even when they ob-
served actions with the other handle. However, these priming eVects
were signiWcantly smaller than those obtained when actions with the
same handle were observed.Exp Brain Res (2009) 199:49–58 57
123
Our data suggest that participants take into account
both, the movements of the actor as well as those of the
physical device, when observing human interaction with
physical devices. A recent study on cooperative action,
although tackling a diVerent research question, is in accor-
dance with this view. Shibata et al. (2007) used near-infra-
red spectroscopy to measure brain activation in
participants, who watched movie clips of a person passing
an object to a receiver. The movies diVered with respect to
the appropriateness of the receiving action for the speciWc
passing action displayed. For instance, an inappropriate
action would be to try to catch a big object that approaches
straight from the front using a precision grip, instead of a
power grip. The results showed greater activation for
receiving actions that were appropriate for the speciWc
passing action in brain areas typically associated with the
mirror neuron system. Hence, motor activation reXected
not only the receiving action, but also the prior passing
action. The authors conclude that the mirror neuron system
might be involved in the understanding of cooperative
action. In a similar way as the understanding of coopera-
tive action between humans, the understanding of human
interaction with physical devices depends on both, the
action of the human actor and the behaviour of the physi-
cal device. The actor’s movements have to be selected
according to the mechanical structure of the physical
device to generate the desired environmental eVect. The
present results are in accordance with the results by
Shibata et al. (2007) in showing that motor resonance depends
on both, the movements of an actor and the associated
behaviour of the physical device. The fact that priming
eVects were only sensitive to those aspects of the human
movement, which are of functional relevance for the
action, suggests that a function of this kind of motor reso-
nance could be needed to facilitate action understanding or
action prediction.
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